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Official Diary

Acting DD/I

Monday, 24 November 1952

25X1A6c

25X1A6a 1. At morning meeting, took responsibility for the O/RR part of the reported Snafu [REDACTED] see incoming [REDACTED] DCI treated the matter lightly, somewhat to FW's dismay but I agreed with FW afterwards to give him a full report and examine into the possibility of further tightening of our arrangements for pre-travel briefings, etc.

25X1A5a1

2. Also at the morning meeting, mentioned the conference last week [REDACTED] attended by some of our economists, at which Messrs. [REDACTED]

25X1A5a1 [REDACTED] et al, expressed the view that we were underrating the Soviets' economic growth and gave, as a consensus, a prediction of 1975 as the year in which total Soviet industrial production would exceed for the first time that of the United States. DCI commented, "I should live so long," but went on to say that long before that time they would be strong enough to hazard embarking on a long, drawn out war. I said that I would bring this matter to the attention of the Board in connection with [REDACTED] and that we would incorporate it in our contribution to '65.

25X1A5a1

3. Attended the latter half of the debriefing of [REDACTED] 25X1A5a1 [REDACTED] He spoke very lucidly and in great detail of both the political and economic situation in Iran and in addition of the oil properties. The possibilities arising out of the new discoveries of major oil fields within sixty miles of Teheran were also covered. He was definitely of the opinion that [REDACTED]

25X6A [REDACTED] at the same time, that some formula had to be discovered which could add oil income to the economy of Iran if it was to be saved from Tudeh.

25X6A

25X1A5a1 [REDACTED]

25X1X7 [REDACTED]

6. Conferred with Edgar Hoover and Allen Dulles on the summary evaluation paper. Then attended with Mr. Dulles the meeting of the Steering Group. Mr. Dulles had to leave after approximately a half an hour and I remained for nearly two hours more while all sorts of sniping and nit-picking went on with respect to DCI's proposals. At the end of the meeting, it was agreed that I should attempt to obtain clarification to some doubtful points from DCI and have a draft of recommended action for Senior Staff to consider placing before the Council when it meets on Wednesday. Upon return, took a hand at this and checked with Mr. Dulles, and did it once more.

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25X1A9a

25X1X6

7. Conferred with [REDACTED] regarding alarmist reports from one [REDACTED] about Russian air-alerts in the Far East and reinforcement by over a thousand planes. I am inclined to rate it about D-5.

25X1A9a

8. Conferred with [REDACTED] regarding the forthcoming meeting on the super-grade paper. Expressed my view that although nothing could now be done, O/SI had come out of the picture with an unduly large number of such supergrades and that first-class economists and industrialists were no more readily available at low wages than were scientists. Also feel FDD when properly reorganized in accordance with the [REDACTED] memo will definitely rate a GS-16.

25X1A9a

25X1A5a1

25X1B4d

9. Conferred with [REDACTED] O/RR consultants, on the progress being made by the [REDACTED]. Their appreciation was that the input and collation of information was proceeding very successfully but that the production of finished intelligence was lagging. We agreed at this time it was more important to get the former on a solid basis than it was to press for too much finished product but that efforts should be made to keep at least a reasonable stream flowing out of the shop.

25X1X7

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